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I. INTRODUCTION

The stated purpose of the Food and Drug Administration
("FDA" or "Agency") is "to promote and protect the public health."1 In
furtherance of this end, the FDA has created a regulatory framework
to ensure that drugs marketed to the general public are both safe and
effective. 2 However, critics insist that the FDA's paternalistic drug
3
approval process does little to achieve its goal.
At the onset of the AIDS epidemic in the 1980s, criticism of the
FDA intensified, as the FDA's lengthy and expensive drug approval
process hindered terminally ill AIDS patients' access to potentially
lifesaving treatment. 4 Advocates for these patients clamored for
increased and expedited access to experimental drugs. 5 In response,
the FDA liberalized its experimental drug policies. This response was
not enough, however, to save Abigail Burroughs. Abigail, a twenty-one
year-old honors student at the University of Virginia, died in 2001
after exhausting all FDA-approved treatments for her cancer. Prior to
her death, Abigail unsuccessfully attempted to gain access through
clinical trials to the experimental cancer drugs Iressa and Erbitux
6
(since approved by the FDA).
In Abigail Alliance v. Von Eschenbach, a lawsuit filed by the
foundation named in Abigail's honor, a three-judge panel of the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled in May 2006 that
terminally ill patients have a due process right of access to such
experimental drugs. 7 However, the D.C. Circuit reheard the case en
banc and reversed the decision 8-2 in August 2007.8 The Supreme
1.
FDA Overview, http://www.fda.gov/oc/opacom/fdal1O/sld001.html (last visited Mar. 20,
2008).
2.
21 C.F.R. §§ 310-14 (2008).
3.
See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Regulatory Paternalism in the Market for Drugs: Lessons
from Vioxx and Celebrex, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POLy L. & ETHICs 741 (2005); Michael E. Horwin,
"War on Cancer" Why Does the FDA Deny Access to Alternative Cancer Treatments?, 13 ALB. L.J.
SCI. & TECH. 681 (2003); Steven R. Salbu, Regulation of Drug Treatments for HIV and AIDS: A
ContractarianModel ofAccess, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 401 (1994).
4.
Michael D. Greenberg, AIDS, Experimental Drug Approval, and the FDA New Drug
Screening Process, 3 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POLy 295, 309-10 (2000); Joanna E. Siegel & Marc
J. Roberts, Reforming FDA Policy: Lessons from the AIDS Experience, REGULATION, Fall 2001, at
71, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regvl4n4/regl4n4-siegel.html.
5.
Siegel & Roberts, supra note 4; see also Salbu, supra note 3, at 410.
6.
Complaint at 5, Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. McClellan,
No. 03-1601 (RMU), 2004 WL 3777340 (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 2004) (Civ. A. No. 1:03CV1601)
[hereinafter Abigail Alliance Complaint].
7.
445 F.3d 470, 472 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
8.
Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d
695 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc), affg No. 03-1601 (RMU), 2004 WL 3777340 (D.D.C. Aug. 30,
2004), rev'g 445 F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
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Court denied the Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental
Drugs's ("Abigail Alliance's" or "Alliance's") petition for a writ of
certiorari in January. 9 Even if the Court had taken the case, however,
it likely would have followed precedent and deferred to Congress and
the FDA on the question of drug regulation. 10 Despite the Court's
denial of Abigail Alliance's petition-and despite the likely disposition
had the Court granted cert-it is time to reform the FDA framework
so that it no longer impedes the access of terminally ill patients to
experimental drugs.
This Note concludes that the greatest prospect for successful
reform lies in the legislative process. Reform of the FDA framework
through the courts or through the administrative process is likely to
prove unavailing. To show why, this Note first reviews the history of
FDA regulation, both generally and as applied to terminally ill
patients. The Note then demonstrates that the courts cannot bring
about successful reform. Proponents of greater access to experimental
drugs have no statutory argument and only weak constitutional
arguments. Thus, courts should exercise restraint and defer to the
judgment of Congress and the FDA on the question of drug
regulation-a question of science and medicine. Once the need for
some government regulation of scientific and medical questions is
acknowledged, Congress and executive agencies-the political
branches, rather than the judicial branch-are best equipped to fine
tune regulatory policy.
Because recently proposed regulatory reforms are unlikely to
succeed, this Note concludes that Congress must step in. The recently
proposed Access, Compassion, Care, and Ethics for Seriously Ill
Patients Act ("ACCESS Act") provides a model for legislative reform of
the FDA framework. 1 ' The Note endorses the Act, along with several
suggested modifications to improve the legislation and its chance of
enactment. In conclusion, the Note recognizes the implications of its
analysis on other questions of science and medicine-from abortion to
are
medical marijuana to physician-assisted suicide-which
traditionally addressed by the judiciary.
9.
128 S. Ct. 1069 (2008); see Linda Greenhouse, Justices Won't Hear Appeal on Drugs for
Terminally Ill, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/15/
washington/15appeal.html?_r=l&scp=l&sq=abigail+alliance&st=nyt&oref=slogin.
10. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 27-28 (2005) (deferring to Congress's prohibition
of marijuana use for all purposes, including medicinal); United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S.
544, 559 (1979) ('"Whether, as a policy matter, an exemption [to the FDA drug approval process]
should be created [for terminally ill patients] is a question for legislative judgment, not judicial
inference.").
11. Access, Compassion, Care, and Ethics for Seriously Ill Patients Act, S. 1956, 109th
Cong. (2005).

1284

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol.61:4:1281

II. THE FDA REGULATORY SCHEME
A. The Gold Standard:A History of FDA Regulation
In 1906, President Theodore Roosevelt signed the Food and
Drugs Act ("1906 Act"), delegating its implementation to the Bureau of
Chemistry in the Department of Agriculture. 12 This Bureau eventually
became the FDA, an agency within the Department of Health and
Human Services. 13 Although the history of drug regulation in the
United States dates back to the colonial period, when Virginia's
legislature passed an act to address the dispensing of more drugs than
was "necessary or useful" in 1736, no semblance of today's regulatory
14
scheme existed prior to the 1906 Act.
Congress passed the 1906 Act amid public outcry over the
appalling conditions of the Chicago meatpacking industry portrayed in
Upton Sinclair's novel The Jungle.'5 The 1906 Act prohibited
adulterated or misbranded food or drugs from entering interstate
commerce, but did nothing to prevent unsafe food or drugs from
entering the market. 16 With no standards in place for testing or
regulatory approval of new drugs, the drug company Massengill
distributed a liquid treatment for sore throats containing diethylene
glycol, a deadly poison, in 1937.17 Use of this drug resulted in 107
deaths, a fine of only $26,100 for the manufacturer under the 1906
Act, and political support for more stringent federal regulation of new
drugs. 18
The Massengill tragedy led to the passage of the Food Drug
and Cosmetic Act of 1938 ("FDCA"), 19 which required drug companies
to seek FDA approval before introducing their drugs to the market. 20
Although drug companies were obliged to submit a New Drug

12. Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., The Food and Drug Administration
Celebrates 100 Years of Service to the Nation (Jan. 4, 2006), available at http://www.fda.gov
/bbs/topics[NEWS/2006/NEW01292.html.
13.
14.

Id.
GLENN SONNEDECKER, KREMERS AND URDANG'S HISTORY OF PHARMACY 158 (Am. Inst.

of the History of Pharmacy 1986) (1963).
15. Lois K. Perrin, Note, The Catch-22for Persons with AIDS: To Have or Not to Have Easy
Access to Experimental Therapies and Early Approval for New Drugs, 69 S. CAL. L. REV 105, 109
(1995).
16.

JAMES ROBERT NIELSEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL DRUG LAW 3 (1986).

17.

Id.

18.
19.
20.

Perrin, supra note 15, at 110.
Id.; Salbu, supra note 3, at 407.
Greenberg, supra note 4, at 302.
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Application to the FDA, express regulatory approval was not
required. 21 If the FDA did not disapprove within sixty days, a New
Drug Application became effective and the company was free to begin
22
commercial development of the drug.
It took another drug-induced health crisis to create the
regulatory structure that the FDA administers today. In 1962, the
sleeping pill thalidomide, developed and distributed in Europe, was
discovered to cause severe birth defects.2 3 Although the FDA had not
approved thalidomide for use in the United States, public concern
resulted in the 1962 Kefauver-Harris Amendments to the FDCA. 24
Known as the Drug Efficacy Amendments, these provisions, still in
effect, require drug companies to provide proof of both safety and
effectiveness before achieving FDA approval. 25 Moreover, the
amendments require that drug companies receive approval of new
drugs from the FDA and that the FDA provide guidelines to drug
26
companies for meeting the effectiveness standard.
The Drug Efficacy Amendments established "the era of the
FDA's 'gold standard' for pre-market approval of drugs." 27 The FDA
regulations implementing these amendments have changed little since
1962. The approval process begins when a company submits an
Investigational New Drug ("IND") application to the FDA after initial
animal testing. 28 If approved, the company is free to begin Phase I
testing of the drug on a small sample of patients or volunteers to
determine the drug's safety. 29 Phase II testing consists of randomized,
double-blind clinical trials, limited to several hundred subjects, and
designed to determine the drug's effectiveness in treating the target
disease.3 0 Phase III testing is performed on a larger sample size of
several hundred to several thousand subjects to collect more data on
the drug's effectiveness and to confirm the drug's safety. 31 Companies
then submit test results to the FDA for review. Although FDA review
is meant to be completed within 180 days, reports suggest that the

21. Id. at 303.
22. Id.
23. NIELSEN, supra note 16, at 5.
24. Greenberg, supra note 4, at 303.
25. NIELSEN, supranote 16, at 5.
26. Greenberg, supra note 4, at 303.
27. Alison R. McCabe, Note, A PrecariousBalancingAct-The Role of the FDA as Protector
of PublicHealth and Industry Wealth, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 787, 790 (2003).
28. Perrin, supra note 15, at 112.
29. 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(a) (2008).
30. Id. § 312.21(b).
31. Id. § 312.21(c).
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approval process often lasts for years. 32 Only after FDA approval may
33
drug companies begin full-scale marketing of new drugs.
The FDA's approval process for new drugs seems consistent
with the FDCA's mandate to "limit interstate commerce in drugs to
those that are safe and effective."3 4 Yet, as with any regulatory policy,
the agency must strive to balance competing societal interests.
Historically, the American public clamored for increased FDA
regulation of new drugs; however, more recent criticism has focused
on how the FDA's "gold standard" impedes consumer access to new,
35
potentially lifesaving, treatments.
B. Critique of the FDA's Gold Standard
While some level of drug regulation is both necessary and
desirable, debate over the appropriate level of government
intervention persists. 36 Some favor even greater regulation than the
FDA currently provides-especially in light of recent publicity over
the adverse side effects of FDA-approved drugs such as Vioxx and
Bextra. 37 However, criticism also centers on the adverse side effects of
FDA overregulation. Specifically, critics cite the increased costs of
regulation and the concomitant delay in bringing drugs to the market,
as well as governmental interference with both personal autonomy
38
and the doctor-patient relationship.
The cost of bringing a new drug to market through the FDA
approval process has been estimated at between $250 and $500
million.3 9 Such exorbitant expenditures prevent small drug companies
32. McCabe, supra note 27, at 791 (noting that the review period could take up to thirty
months); Perrin, supra note 15, at 113 (noting that in 1994 the average approval process lasted
twenty-six months).
33. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2000) ("No person shall introduce or deliver for introduction into
interstate commerce any new drug, unless an approval of an application filed pursuant to
subsection (b) or (j) of this section is effective with respect to such drug.").
34. NIELSEN, supra note 16, at 3.
35. See, e.g., Greenberg, supra note 4, at 296; Perrin, supra note 15, at 113-14.
36. Siegel & Roberts, supra note 4.
37. Editorial, Vioxx: An Unequal PartnershipBetween Safety and Efficacy, 364 LANCET
1287, 1288 (2004).
38. See, e.g., Michael D. Greenberg, Information, Paternalism, and Rational DecisionMaking: The Balance of FDA New Drug Approval, 13 ALB. L.J. ScI. & TECH. 663, 669 (2003);
Horwin, supra note 3, at 716-17; Siegel & Roberts, supra note 4.
39. Horwin, supra note 3, at 716-17. Estimates of cost vary greatly. Compare Greenberg,
supra note 38, at 664 n.2 (giving an estimate of $230 million in 1990, and citing a Senate report
estimating average cost at $500 million per new drug), with John P. Dillman, Note, Prescription
Drug Approval and Terminal Diseases: Desperate Times Require Desperate Measures, 44 VAND.
L. REV. 925, 935 (1991) (estimating the cost to be $100 million dollars "from initial synthesis to
final marketing").
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from new drug development and prevent even large multinational
companies from developing potentially effective drugs that they
40
cannot patent or that are unlikely to recoup such a large investment.
Besides reducing innovation, extensive FDA regulation has created
the "drug lag"-a delay before new drugs available in other developed
nations become available in the United States. 4 1 The delay results
from the length, stringency, and cost of the FDA approval process.
Moreover, the approval process may keep beneficial drugs off the
market entirely; it has been argued that the FDA's current regulatory
policy would have withheld approval from such drugs as penicillin and
42
aspirin.
The costs of FDA regulation go beyond time and money.
Consumer protection regulation may also interfere with individual
autonomy. FDA policy prevents much consumer access to new drugs
43
that have not yet completed the extensive FDA approval process.
The limited access available is restricted to patients who manage to
enroll in clinical trials. 44 Thus, patients who cannot gain access to a
clinical trial must wait for the approval process to run its course
despite having no other treatment options. 4 5 This regulation interferes
not only with individual choice, but also with a choice that the
individual made with her doctor. The FDA testing and approval
process does produce valuable information that may be of great use to
the general public.
However, an individual patient and doctor
presumably are in the best position to determine whether a particular
experimental treatment is worth the risk-before the FDA approves or
46
disapproves use of the drug for patients generally.
40. Horwin, supra note 3, at 717; Dillman, supra note 39, at 935.
41. Siegel & Roberts, supranote 4; Dillman, supra note 39, at 936. As with costs of the drug
approval process, estimates of the length of the drug approval process vary greatly, as well.
Compare Salbu, supra note 3, at 404-05 (claiming that the length of time between initial
investigation and FDA approval averaged twelve years prior to reform in the 1980s), with Lynne
K. Lechter, Regulatory Overkill and the AIDS Patient, 1 ALB. L.J. SC. & TECH. 131, 158 (1991)
(citing the average time between drug creation and FDA approval to be between seven and
thirteen years).
42. Lechter, supra note 41, at 159.
43. Perrin, supra note 15, at 106.
44. Id. Entry in clinical trials may be difficult or impossible because of the age of the
patient, the patient's geographical location, or the patient's medical history. See, e.g., Alissa
Puckett, The ProperFocus for FDA Regulations: Why the FundamentalRight to Self-Preservation
Should Allow Terminally 1ll Patients With No Treatment Options to Attempt to Save Their Lives,
60 SMU L. REV. 635, 643 ("Gaining access to a clinical trial is difficult. There are a limited
number of spaces available for Phases II and III, and drug companies require a patient to be in a
certain stage of the disease, at least eighteen years of age, and, in some cases, to not have taken
certain drugs or treatments.").
45. See sources cited supranote 40.
46. Horwin, supra note 3, at 708.
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Criticism of regulatory interference with individual choice is
particularly resonant in the context of terminally ill patients' access to
experimental drugs. Terminally ill patients who have exhausted all
available remedies face a different risk-benefit analysis than that of
the general public. 47 Experimental drugs pose little additional risk to
patients facing death, whereas the slightest possibility of
improvement or cure provides a great benefit. 48 Under these
circumstances, the argument in favor of liberalizing the FDA's drug
approval process is surely at its strongest.
C. FDA's Response: Liberalizing the New Drug Approval Scheme
The 1980s witnessed a health crisis that increased FDA
regulation could not alleviate. The AIDS epidemic highlighted the
failings of the FDA's drug approval process, as the broad scope of FDA
regulation prevented development of and access to new drugs for
patients suffering from and dying of AIDS. 49 AIDS activists pointed
out the inadequacy of FDA policy as it related to terminally ill AIDS
patients for whom approved treatments provided no relief. These
patients needed either expedited approval of new drugs or access to
experimental drugs before completion of the FDA's extensive approval
process. Faced with political pressure from AIDS activists and enabled
by the deregulatory atmosphere of the Reagan and first Bush
administrations, the FDA began to liberalize its policies and
promulgate regulations providing terminally ill patients, and AIDS
50
patients in particular, earlier access to new drugs.
The FDA historically has provided a "Compassionate Use"
exemption for individual patients who are ineligible for clinical trials
or who have exhausted all FDA-approved treatment to access
experimental drugs. 51 On a case-by-case basis, this exemption has
permitted pharmaceutical companies to provide unapproved drugs to
treat severely ill patients.5 2 Traditionally, however, the FDA granted
exemptions only pursuant to an application by a patient's doctor

47. Greenberg, supra note 4, at 298.
48. Id. at 315.
49. See id. at 296 (noting that the FDA impeded "the development of, and access to, new
medications").
50. Id. at 296-97.
51. Id. at 315; Sheila R. Shulman & Jeffrey S. Brown, The Food and Drug Administration's
Early Access and Fast-Track Approval Initiatives: How Have They Worked?, 50 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 503, 505 (1995).
52. Greenberg, supra note 4, at 316.
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through a process involving substantial red tape. 53 Access depended on
pharmaceutical companies supplying drugs free of charge, as the
54
prohibition on marketing unapproved drugs remained in place.
In 1987, the FDA promulgated regulations expanding the
uncodified Compassionate Use exemption. 55 The regulations currently
allow access to experimental drugs prior to completion of the FDA
approval process, through a Treatment IND, if four conditions are
met: (1) the drug is intended to treat a serious or life-threatening
disease; (2) no satisfactory alternative exists; (3) the drug is already
under investigation through FDA-controlled trials; and (4) the drug
56
sponsor is pursuing marketing approval for the new drug actively.
Furthermore, the FDA now permits drug companies to recover
manufacturing, research and development, and distribution costs by
charging patients for experimental drugs, thereby incentivizing
companies to provide them, or at least eliminating the economic
disincentive. 57 Ordinarily, the FDA grants Treatment INDs only
during Phase III trials, though under undefined "appropriate
circumstances," it may grant them during Phase 11.58 However, the
Treatment IND exemption still contains an effectiveness requirement
that has limited its use to drugs in the latter stages of clinical
testing. 59 Moreover, the exemption applies only to broad groups of
patients needing access to a particular drug, while individual access is
left to the discretion of the FDA through its informal Compassionate
60
Use policy.
In 1988, Vice President George H.W. Bush, Chairman of the
Presidential Task Force of Regulatory Relief, asked the FDA to design
procedures that would expedite the marketing of new drugs intended
to treat AIDS and other serious illnesses. 61 In response, the FDA
promulgated new rules, known as the Subpart E regulations, designed
to encourage collaboration between drug companies and FDA officials
to ensure future FDA approval. 62 In some instances, Phase III trials

53. Id.
54. Id.
55. 21 C.F.R. § 312.34 (2008); Siegel & Roberts, supranote 4.
56. 21 C.F.R. § 312.34.
57. Greenberg, supra note 4, at 319; Shulman & Brown, supra note 51, at 505.
58. Salbu, supra note 3, at 411.
59. Greenberg, supra note 4, at 318-19; Siegel & Roberts, supra note 4.
60. Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,147,
75,148 (proposed Dec. 14, 2006).
61. Perrin, supra note 15, at 129.
62. 21 C.F.R. §§ 312.80-.88 (2008); Shulman & Brown, supra note 51, at 511; Siegel &
Roberts, supra note 4; Perrin, supra note 15, at 129.
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are eliminated and replaced with Phase IV post-marketing trials that
shift some of the research burden until after the FDA has approved an
experimental drug and the drug company has begun to recoup its
investment. 63 Additionally, the regulations require the FDA to
consider both the severity of disease and the absence of alternative
treatment in approving a drug, suggesting recognition that FDA
policies should differ when applied to the terminally ill.64
In 1992, the FDA again amended its policy through
promulgation of the Accelerated Approval Regulations, which permit
65
application of "surrogate endpoints" to measure drug efficacy.
Although drug effectiveness ordinarily is measured by extended
patient survival, the use of surrogate endpoints allows effectiveness to
be measured by evidence of intermediate physiological or biochemical
effects that may predict extended patient survival, but do not prove
it.66 Arguably, the Accelerated Approval Regulations provide the
greatest liberalization of FDA policy, as they are the only regulations
67
that alter the traditional framework of new drug testing.
Congress also has made efforts to expedite FDA approval of
experimental drugs through enactment of the Prescription Drug User
Fee Act ("PDUFA") in 1992.68 The PDUFA permits the FDA to charge
drug companies "user fees" that help to fund the FDA's approval
process. The fees support a larger staff of FDA reviewers and
subsidize technologies meant to accelerate approval. 69 The PDUFA
proved so effective in increasing FDA drug approval rates that
Congress reauthorized the user fee policy in the FDA Modernization
Act of 1997 and again through the Prescription Drug User Fee
Amendments in 2002.70 According to a United States General
Accounting Office Report to the U.S. Senate, from 1993 to 2001, the
average approval time of new drug applications for standard drugs

63. Greenberg, supranote 4, at 322-23.
64. Shulman & Brown, supranote 51, at 512.
65. 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.500, 601.40; Greenberg, supra note 4, at 322; Shulman & Brown, supra
note 51, at 514.
66. 21 C.F.R. § 315.500; Greenberg, supra note 4, at 323.
67. See Shulman & Brown, supra note 51, at 514 (arguing that, due to the flexibility of its
standard, "the accelerated approval rule.., represents the most significant departure from the
traditional FDA standards for drug approval").
68. 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 379g-379h (West 2007).
69. McCabe, supra note 27, at 792.
70. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-958, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON
HEALTH, EDUCATION, LABOR, AND PENSIONS, U.S. SENATE, EFFECT OF USER FEES ON DRUG

APPROVAL TIMES, WITHDRAWALS, AND OTHER AGENCY ACTIVITIES 3 (2002), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02958.pdf.
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dropped from twenty-seven to fourteen months. 71 Congress most
recently reauthorized the policy in September 2007.72

III.

FURTHER CONCERNS: ARE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS ENOUGH?

In the twenty years since the FDA and Congress began
responding to the AIDS epidemic, the FDA approval process has been
expedited, and terminally ill patients have been granted increased
access to experimental drugs. 73 However, these positive results beg the
question whether these new developments have done enough. The
approval process remains lengthy and expensive. For patients who
cannot gain access to clinical trials, the FDA's regulatory scheme
prevents immediate relief. 74 Although the FDA may grant a
Treatment IND exemption to broad groups of patients in need, access
for an individual terminally ill patient is left to the complete
discretion of the FDA. Although the FDA is a consumer protection
agency, perhaps its framework, guided by the FDCA, does not protect
terminally ill patients adequately. Two arguments suggest the FDCA
and its associated regulations should not apply to the terminally ill: a
statutory interpretation argument and a constitutional argument.
A. The Statutory InterpretationArgument
In United States v. Rutherford, plaintiffs raised a statutory
argument that the FDCA should not apply to the terminally ill.
Cancer patients and their spouses sought judicial review of the FDA's
determination that a substance known as Laetrile was a "new drug"
under the FDCA and that, therefore, the FDA could exclude Laetrile
75
from interstate commerce absent an approved new drug application.
While the district court's decision for the plaintiffs focused on the
patients' constitutional right to privacy, 76 the Tenth Circuit Court of

71. Id.
72. FDA, Prescription Drug User Fees, http://www.fda.gov/oc/pdufa/ (last visited Mar. 17,
2008).
73. See Shulman & Brown, supra note 51, at 505-17 (reviewing the results of the Treatment
IND, parallel track, Subpart E regulations, and Accelerated Approval Regulations from their
implementation through December 31, 1994).
74. See Geeta Anand, The Most Expensive Drugs-Rx for an Industry, WALL ST. J., Dec. 28,
2005, at Al. (noting that, according to drug manufacturer Eli Lilly & Co, "[d]espite enormous
advances in understanding biology, it takes roughly the same amount of time today as it did 20
years ago to bring a new drug to market... [and] costs about $200 million per drug").
75.

442 U.S. 544, 548 (1979).

76. Rutherford v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 1287, 1298-1301 (W.D. Okla. 1977), aff'd, 582
F.2d 1234 (10th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 422 U.S. 544 (1979).
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Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment based on its reading of
77
the statutory language.
The Tenth Circuit relied on section 505 of the FDCA, which
provides that the sponsor of a new drug must demonstrate "whether
or not such drug is safe for use and whether such drug is effective in
use" before the FDA may grant approval for introduction into
interstate commerce. 78 The Tenth Circuit found that this language
had "no reasonable application to terminally ill cancer patients." 79 In
the context of terminal patients, the court concluded that there were
no reasonable standards by which to measure safety and
effectiveness. 80 For a patient facing death, suffering an adverse effect
from an "unsafe" drug constituted an inconsequential risk. For a
patient who has not responded to conventional therapy, taking an
"ineffective" drug is nothing new. Thus, the court found that Laetrile
was as safe and effective as any approved treatment and enjoined the
FDA from interfering with the plaintiffs' procurement of intravenous
81
injections of the drug.
Had the Supreme Court upheld this decision, drugs taken by
terminally ill patients would have been excluded from regulation
under the FDCA. However, the Supreme Court reversed the Tenth
Circuit, holding that the "plain and unambiguous language" of the
FDCA did not provide an implicit exemption for drugs used to treat
the terminally ill.82 The Court noted that "[e]xceptions to clearly
delineated statutes will be implied only where essential to prevent
'absurd results' or consequences obviously at variance with the policy
of the enactment as a whole."83 Looking to the legislative history of the
FDCA and its consistent administration by the FDA, the Court found
reasonable standards by which to measure safety and effectiveness in
the context of the terminally ill.84 The Court deemed a drug safe
"when the expected therapeutic gain justifies the risk entailed by its
use" and a drug effective "if it fulfills, by objective indices, its sponsor's
claims of prolonged life, improved physical condition, or reduced

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Rutherford, 582 F.2d at 1236-37.
21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (2000).
Rutherford, 582 F.2d at 1236.
Id. at 1237.
Id.
Rutherford v. United States, 442 U.S. 544, 551 (1979).
Id. at 552
Id. at 552-55.
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pain."8 5 The Court found that the application of these definitions to
86
terminally ill patients did not produce absurd results.
However, perhaps the Court meant only to discourage future
litigation that would force the judiciary to administer the FDCA-a
job it thought better left to Congress and the FDA.8 7 In its concluding
remarks, the Court noted that, although the text of the FDCA would
not allow the judiciary to exclude drugs used to treat terminally ill
patients from its scope, that policy question was a matter for
88
legislative judgment.
B. The ConstitutionalArgument
Although the Tenth Circuit and the Supreme Court decided
Rutherford on a question of statutory interpretation, the Rutherford
plaintiffs originally challenged the FDA's policy to exclude Laetrile
from interstate commerce as a violation of their constitutional rights.8 9
The district court agreed, holding that by denying terminally ill
patients Laetrile "in connection with [their] own personal health-care,
[the] FDA ha[d] offended the constitutional right of privacy." 90 In
addition to citing the fundamental right to privacy found by the
Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade, the district court relied heavily on the
concurring opinion of Justice Douglas in Doe v. Bolton, in which "the
freedom to care for one's health and person" came within the purview
of that right. 91 Justice Douglas found that "the right of privacy... has
no more conspicuous place than in the physician-patient
relationship ."92
The Supreme Court chose to avoid the constitutional issue
implicated in Rutherford. When faced with a similar question in 2008,
the Court again side-stepped the constitutional issue by denying cert
in Abigail Alliance.93 In May 2006, a three-judge panel of the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled that mentally
competent, terminally ill adult patients, who have no alternative FDAapproved treatment options, have a fundamental due process right of

85. Id. at 555.
86. Id.
87. Perrin, supra note 15, at 124.
88. Rutherford, 442 U.S. at 559.
89. Rutherford v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 1287, 1290 (W.D. Okla. 1977).
90. Id. at 1301.
91. Id. at 1299 (quoting Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 213 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring)).
92. Id.
93. 128 S. Ct. 1069 (2008).
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access to potentially lifesaving post-Phase I experimental drugs. 94 In
November 2006, the court decided to rehear the case en banc, 95 and in
August 2007, the en banc court reversed the panel's decision. 96 Abigail
Alliance filed a petition with the Supreme Court in September 2007
requesting that the Court review and overturn the D.C. Circuit's en
banc ruling. With its denial of the petition, however, the Court allowed
the en banc ruling to stand.
The Abigail Alliance, the named plaintiff in Abigail Alliance v.
Von Eschenbach, is a nonprofit organization founded in 2001 by Frank
Burroughs. 97 The group is named for Mr. Burroughs's daughter,
Abigail, an honors student at the University of Virginia. At age
nineteen, doctors diagnosed Abigail with head and neck cancer. She
underwent conventional chemotherapy and radiation treatments for
the next eighteen months. In March 2001, Abigail ran out of FDAapproved treatment options, but her oncologist advised her that the
experimental cancer drugs Iressa and Erbitux could save her life.
Unfortunately, Abigail was unable to qualify for the limited clinical
trials of either drug. Without access to the experimental treatments,
Abigail died on June 9, 2001, at the age of twenty-one.
The Abigail Alliance filed a citizen petition with the FDA,
proposing that the Agency allow earlier access to experimental
drugs. 98 When the FDA rejected the Alliance's proposal, the Alliance,
together with the Washington Legal Foundation, filed suit against the
FDA Commissioner and the Secretary of the Department of Health
and Human Services. 99 The plaintiffs sought to enjoin enforcement of
the FDA policy barring the sale of post-Phase I experimental drugs to
terminally ill patients who, like Abigail, cannot qualify for clinical
trials. 10 0 Specifically, the Alliance claimed that the FDA regulation
preventing access to experimental drugs where there is insufficient
evidence of effectiveness or an unreasonable risk of injury interferes
with a fundamental liberty interest to access experimental drugs and

94. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 445 F.3d
470, 486 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
95. 469 F.3d 129 (D.C. Cir. 2006), vacating 445 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
96. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d
695, 714 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc), aff'g No. 03-1601 (RMU), 2004 WL 3777340 (D.D.C. Aug. 30,
2004), rev'g 445 F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
97. For relevant facts regarding the Abigail Alliance referenced in this paragraph, see
Abigail Alliance Complaint, supra note 6, at 5.
98. Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 699.
99. Id. at 700.
100. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 445 F.3d
470, 473-74 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
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therefore must be subject to strict scrutiny. 10 The district court
02
dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint for failure to state a claim.'
However, applying the test for addressing substantive due process
claims set forth by the Supreme Court in Washington v. Glucksberg, a
divided three-judge panel of the D.C. Circuit recognized the due
process right claimed by the plaintiffs and remanded the case to the
district court to determine whether the FDA's policy "[was] narrowly
103
tailored to serve a compelling [governmental] interest."'
The D.C. Circuit panel relied on the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, which provides that "[n]o
person shall be ...deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law."' 0 4 The clause prevents governmental interference with
certain fundamental rights and liberty interests. 10 5 In Washington v.
Glucksberg, where it addressed whether the right to assistance in
committing suicide is a fundamental right protected by the Due
Process Clause, the Supreme Court enumerated three guideposts for
06
the courts in pronouncing an unenumerated due process right.
First, a court must provide a "careful description of the fundamental
liberty interest."' 07 Second, a court must ask whether the right
asserted is "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."'0
Finally, a court must find the right " 'implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty,' such that 'neither liberty nor justice would exist if [it] were
sacrificed.' "109
According to Judges Ginsburg and Rogers on the D.C. Circuit
panel, Abigail Alliance fulfilled the first requirement of the Glucksberg
test. The plaintiffs delineated the right to be recognized by the court in
Count II of the complaint: willing and mentally competent terminally
ill patients with no other treatment options have a due process right

101. Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 701 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 312.34(b)(3) (2008)). Abigail
Alliance also challenged the regulation prohibiting drug manufacturers from profiting on the sale
of experimental drugs. Id. (citing 21 C.F.R. § 312.7(d)(3) (2008)).
102. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. McClellan, No. 03-1601
(RMU), 2004 WL 3777340, at *2 (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 2004).
103. Abigail Alliance, 445 F. 3d at 472 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721
(1997)).
104. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
105. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993) (explaining the "substantive component" of
due process as "forbid[ding] the government to infringe certain 'fundamental' liberty interests at
all, no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest").
106. 521 U.S. at 720-23.
107. Id. at 721.
108. Id. at 720-21 (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
109. Id. at 721 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 326 (1937)).
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not to be prohibited from accessing experimental drugs that have
completed Phase I review. 11 0 Alternatively stated, the FDA's policy
prohibiting the sale of experimental drugs to these patients violated
their due process right of access. The panel found that this description
met even the narrowest interpretation of the Glucksberg "careful
description" requirement."'
According to the panel, this right to access experimental drugs,
analogous to the right of self-preservation, is "deeply rooted" in the
"history and tradition" of the United States.1 1 2 The right to control
one's body, including the right to self-defense and the right to selfpreservation, has "deep roots in the common law." The principle of
necessity permits an individual to take measures not ordinarily
justified when faced with death, even if these measures interfere with
the rights of others. Furthermore, common law prohibits preventing a
third person from attempting to save the life of another. 113 In contrast
to these historic common law principles, the panel noted that drug
regulation in the United States is relatively new. Not until 1906 did
the FDA's precursor begin to regulate drugs with the passage of the
Pure Food and Drugs Act. Not until 1962 did Congress mandate
evidence of both the safety and effectiveness of new drugs. Thus, for
most of the country's history, patients could obtain access to new and
experimental drugs, consistent with the right of self-preservation,
with little government interference.
Finally, the panel found that the Supreme Court implicitly
acknowledged the right to access experimental drugs in Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Department of Health.114 In Cruzan, the Court
assumed that an individual has a liberty interest in refusing lifesustaining medical treatment.1 1 5 The "logical corollary" to that right,
according to the panel, "is that an individual must also be free to
decide for herself whether to assume any known or unknown risks of
taking a medication that might prolong her life."1 1 6 Essentially, the
panel argued that a liberty interest in choosing death by refusing
treatment is akin to the right to choose a fighting chance at prolonged
life.

110. Abigail Alliance Complaint, supra note 6, at 32.
111. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 445 F.3d
470, 478 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
112. This paragraph cites id. at 480-86.
113. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 326 (1934)).
114. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
115. Id. at 279.
116. Abigail Alliance, 445 F.3d at 484.
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Only Judge Griffith dissented. Besides taking issue with the
majority's application of the Glucksberg test, Judge Griffith noted his
concern with a number of constitutional issues that the newfound
right to access experimental drugs would raise:
If a terminally ill patient has such a right, are patients with serious medical conditions
entitled to the benefit of the same logic and corresponding access? If an indigent cannot
afford potentially life-saving treatment, would the Constitution mandate access to such
care under the right recognized by the majority? Can a patient access any drug (i.e.,
marijuana for medicinal purposes) if she believes, in consultation with a physician, it is
potentially life-saving? Would the majority's right guarantee access to federally-funded
stem cell research and treatment? Perhaps most significantly,1 1what
potential must a
7
treatment have in order for the Constitution to mandate access?

Arguably, the majority's opinion answers some of Judge
Griffith's concerns. For example, the majority states that the right of
access claimed by the Abigail Alliance "does not involve treatment by
the government or a government subsidy.""18 Rather, its claim was of a
negative right "to be free of FDA imposition."' 19 However, the
remainder of the en banc court of appeals agreed with Judge Griffith,
reversing the panel's decision. 120 Only Judges Ginsburg and Rogers,
121
who originally had found for the plaintiffs on the panel, dissented.
Also applying the Glucksberg framework, the en banc court
first questioned whether the constitutional right proposed by the
Alliance could satisfy the Glucksberg "careful description"
requirement. 22 The Alliance claimed that the FDA's current policy
prohibiting the sale of experimental drugs violated due process rights
of mentally competent terminally ill patients with no other treatment
options, and that such patients had a right to access experimental
drugs after they had completed the first phase of clinical testing for
safety. 23 Thus, the specific right proposed by the Alliance depended
on a regulatory determination that a drug was safe for testing after
completing Phase I trials. The en banc court claimed that it was
unlikely that "a constitutional right [could] be defined by an
administrative regulation that is subject to change.' ' 24 Even assuming
arguendo that the proposed right would satisfy the first Glucksberg

117. Id. at 499 (Griffith, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
118. Id. at 484 (majority opinion).
119. Id.
120. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d
695, 714 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc), affg No. 03-1601 (RMU), 2004 WL 3777340 (D.D.C. Aug. 30,
2004), rev'g 445 F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
121. Id. (Rogers, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 702 n.6 (majority opinion).
123. Id. at 703.
124. Id. at 702 n.6.
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requirement, the en banc court determined that the proposed right
failed the second Glucksberg requirement-a right of access to
experimental drugs is not "deeply rooted in our Nation's history and
traditions." The court cited the origin of American drug regulation in
the colonial period. 125 In the end, the court determined that the
debate among the Alliance, the FDA, the scientific and medical
communities, and the public should continue through the political
process. 126
C. Abigail Alliance's PotentialArguments on Appeal
If the Supreme Court had granted cert in this case, Abigail
Alliance may have grounded its appeal in two arguments. An
argument not addressed by either the panel or the en banc court relies
on the "right to die with dignity" addressed in Glucksberg itself.
Although the Glucksberg Court did not find a New York law
prohibiting assisted suicide to violate a fundamental liberty interest
protected by the Due Process Clause, several Justices suggested that
their opinion might differ if the law at issue had prohibited "doctors
from providing patients with drugs sufficient to control pain despite
the risk that those drugs themselves will kill."127 Justice Breyer
articulated the "right to die with dignity," which included the right to
palliative care that may hasten death.128 Although the right
articulated by Justice Breyer only addressed potentially lethal drugs
for controlling pain, arguably this right could include the right to
access potentially lifesaving experimental drugs despite the fact that
they may prove lethal. Dying with dignity should allow a person to die
knowing that he or she has exhausted all possible medical
alternatives.
The plaintiffs' second potential argument could be styled as the
right to medical self-defense. 1 29 Both the D.C. Circuit panel and the en
banc court addressed the issue of self-defense in response to the
argument raised by the Alliance. The en banc court noted that a
125. Id. at 711.
126. Id. at 713.
127. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 791 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring); see also id.
at 737-38 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[T]here is no need to address the question whether
suffering patients have a constitutionally cognizable interest in obtaining relief from the
suffering that they may experience in the last days of their lives. There is no dispute that dying
patients in Washington and New York can obtain palliative care, even when doing so would
hasten their deaths.").
128. Id. at 790 (Breyer, J., concurring).
129. Eugene Volokh, Medical Self-Defense, ProhibitedExperimental Therapies, and Payment
for Organs, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1813 (2007).
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woman's right to abort a fetus at any stage of a pregnancy, if doing so
is necessary to preserve her life or health, may be viewed as a
traditional claim of a right to self-defense, rather than a right to
privacy. 130 The en banc court then deemed the Alliance's argument
that the right of access to experimental drugs analogous to a right of
medical self-defense-both cases involve an individual taking what
otherwise may be impermissible measures in an attempt to save her
life. 13 ' However, the en banc court responded that this analogy fails
"because this case is not about using reasonable force to defend
oneself.... ,"132 The en banc court's response succeeded only in
restating the question.
Legal scholar Eugene Volokh argues that there is a
fundamental right to self-defense, and that the right to medical selfdefense is included in that right.' 33 The right to lethal self-defense
long has been recognized by common law and by statute. In Montana
v. Egelhoff, a plurality of the Supreme Court suggested that a
defendant may have a fundamental right to present evidence of selfdefense in a criminal case. 134 In Roe v. Wade, and later in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, the Court found that a woman had a right to
medical self-defense in the context of a late-term abortion necessary to
preserve her life or health.1 35 Volokh argues: "The Supreme Court has
so far recognized the medical self-defense right only in abortion cases.
Yet the right can't logically be limited to situations in which the
defensive procedure is abortion and rejected when a woman needs to
defend herself using experimental drugs ....
Even if the Supreme Court were to acknowledge a fundamental
right for the terminally ill to access drugs in the future-whether
through a right to die with dignity or through a right to medical selfdefense-the Court still could deem the FDA's policy constitutional if
it found the policy narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
governmental interest. Although the Supreme Court never has
addressed whether the FDA's clinical trial process is narrowly tailored
130. Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 709.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Volokh, supra note 129, at 1817-32.
134. 518 U.S. 37, 55-56 (1996).
135. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 16364 (1973). The Supreme Court did not articulate the right it identified in either case as a right to
medical self-defense. Both Eugene Volokh and Abigail Alliance, however, claim that the right
recognized by the Court is, essentially, just that. Although denying that the right to medical selfdefense exists in the context of access to experimental drugs, the D.C. Circuit en banc did seem
to accept this characterization of Roe and Casey. Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 709.
136. Volokh, supra note 129, at 1826.
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to achieve the governmental interest in approving safe and effective
drugs, the Court's recent abortion decision may shed light on its likely
opinion. In Gonzales v. Carhart, facing the medical community's
uncertainty as to whether a particular "partial-birth" abortion
procedure is ever medically necessary, the Court upheld a
congressional ban on the procedure. 13 7 The Court found that the ban
did not place an "undue burden" on a woman's right to choose to
terminate her pregnancy-even when she and her doctor concluded
the procedure was medically necessary in her case.1 38 Although the
"undue burden" standard is less stringent than the strict scrutiny
analysis that would be applied to a fundamental right to access
experimental drugs, the Alliance should be concerned that the Court
upheld a policy stymieing the medical choice made by an individual in
conjunction with her doctor.
D. FDA's Potential Counterargumenton Appeal
Had the Supreme Court heard this case, it may have
strengthened the FDA's counterargument that the Alliance's claim
should be aired through the political process, rather than in court. The
Alliance's position treads close to the right to access medical
marijuana that the Supreme Court recently denied in Gonzales v.
Raich.139 Furthermore, the en banc court's warning that the balance
between the risks and benefits of experimental drugs is best left to the
legislative and executive branches echoes the Raich's language. 140 In
Raich, the Court suggested that the litigants take their concerns to
"the democratic process, in which the voices of voters allied with these
respondents may one day be heard in the halls of Congress." 141 More
significantly, the en banc court and the Raich opinions are
reminiscent of the Supreme Court's suggestion in Rutherford, almost
three decades prior: "[w]hether, as a policy matter, an exemption
should be created is a question for legislative judgment, not judicial
inference." 142 If Abigail Alliance v. Von Eschenbach had come before
the Supreme Court, it seems likely that the Court would have
continued to follow this line of reasoning, leaving the plaintiffs to take
137. 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1633 (2007).
138. Id.
139. 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005).
140. Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 713 ("Our Nation's history and traditions have consistently
demonstrated that the democratic branches are better suited to decide the proper balance
between the uncertain risks and benefits of medical technology ... .
141. 545 U.S. at 33.
142. 442 U.S. 544, 559 (1979).

2008]

EXPANDED ACCESS TO EXPERIMENTAL DRUGS

1301

their concerns to the FDA and Congress rather than to seek assistance
from the Court and the Constitution.
Perhaps such a question should be addressed through the
political process, rather than through the judicial system. If the FDA's
decision to interfere with a terminally ill patient's decision made with
his or her doctor raises the questions discussed above, so too does a
court's reversal of that decision. The issue involves science and
medicine, which would benefit from congressional hearings or expert
administrative research. The issue blurs the line between science and
policy, which also suggests a need for democratic resolution.
Alternatively, Professor Jessie Hill argues that while it may be
appropriate for courts to defer to legislative determinations of "social
fact," it is "another thing entirely for a legislature to decide when and
whether a particular abortion procedure is medically indicated or
whether cannabis has any legitimate medical use-or for that matter,
to determine the value of pi."'14 3 For Professor Hill, "judicial deference
to legislative fact-finding is particularly inappropriate with respect to
medical fact." 144 Professor Hill worries that the legislature-an
explicitly political branch-is not competent to make scientific or
medical determinations that should be void of politics and value
judgments. 145 Professor Hill extends this public choice argument to
determinations of administrative agencies, such as the FDA's policy on
146
access to experimental drugs.
Even assuming arguendo that judicial decisions are void of the
politics and value judgments that plague legislative and
administrative determinations, the judiciary is still not the
appropriate branch to make scientific or medical determinations. If
the Supreme Court finds the right to access experimental drugs
fundamental, it would constitutionalize the administrative decision
that Phase I drugs are safe for human consumption. Such a decision
would be reminiscent of the Court's decision to constitutionalize the
arbitrary trimester framework in Roe v. Wade, 147 from which it has
148
backed away.
Scientific and medical knowledge and technology inevitably
will change. This evolution conflicts with the Glucksberg "careful
143. B. Jessie Hill, The ConstitutionalRight to Make Medical Treatment Decisions: A Tale of
Two Doctrines, 86 TEX. L. REV. 277, 334 (2007).

144. Id. at 337.
145. Id. at 334-35.
146. Id. at 344-45.
147. 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973).
148. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 883, 873 (1992) (rejecting Roe v. Wade's
"rigid trimester" framework).
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description" requirement of potential due process rights. Any carefully
described right involving the current state of scientific and medical
knowledge is subject to revision. Viability now occurs before the
arbitrary third-trimester demarcation. Drugs that have completed
Phase I testing have completed only the first stage in an arbitrary
scientific experiment. There is nothing fixed, and certainly nothing
constitutional, about the timing of these scientific and medical
questions.
or scientific
medical
wholesale
of making
Instead
determinations, the judiciary is better off deferring to the political
branches on such questions. The en banc court in Abigail Alliance
claimed that
[t]he Alliance's arguments about morality, quality of life, and acceptable levels of
medical risk are certainly ones that can be aired in the democratic branches, without
injecting the courts into unknown questions of science and medicine. Our Nation's
history and traditions have consistently demonstrated that the democratic branches are
better suited to decide the proper balance between the uncertain risks and benefits of
medical technology, and are entitled to deference in doing so. 149

Neither the en banc court nor this Note suggest that Abigail
Alliance's claim to access experimental drugs is invalid, but both
suggest that such a claim may not be addressed fully through judicial
recognition of a new due process right. The right of terminally ill
patients to access experimental drugs may be beyond the judiciary's
competence, and rather than continue on its quest to constitutionalize
the issue, the Alliance should take its valid claim to the political
process.
IV. POTENTIAL MODELS OF FDA REGULATION
Even if the judiciary defers to the FDA and Congress on the
question of access to experimental drugs, the facts that a panel of the
D.C. Circuit ruled in favor of Abigail Alliance and that the Supreme
Court has intimated that drug regulation is ripe for legislative
reconsideration suggest that FDA policy may be in need of some
reform. Several models of FDA regulation have been proposed, from
completely open access to more extensive regulation than the FDA
provides. The Note will briefly discuss three potential models for FDA
regulation of experimental drugs: the Status Quo, Open Access, and
Contractarianism. An analysis of recently proposed FDA regulation on
the issue as well as the ACCESS Act-proposed legislation supported
149. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d
695, 713 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc), aff'g No. 03-1601 (RMU), 2004 WL 3777340 (D.D.C. Aug. 30,
2004), rev'g 445 F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
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by Abigail Alliance-will follow. The Note will conclude with an
endorsement of the ACCESS Act, slightly modified, as a legislative
proposal that best synthesizes the beneficial aspects of the potential
models and adequately addresses their alleged shortcomings.
A. Status Quo
The most obvious model of regulation is the one currently
employed by the FDA, or a variation with more extensive regulation.
Advocating greater regulation, some critics have taken issue with the
amount of regulatory liberalization already taken by the FDA since
the late 1980s, suggesting that the FDA and the public have
misplaced their faith in science. 150 These critics argue that increased
access to experimental drugs has led to an inability to separate hope of
recovery from the reality that most experimental drugs never will
prove effective, and many may prove harmful. 151 Citing the
Nuremberg Code, they suggest that the consent of experimental
subjects
must
be
competent,
voluntary,
informed,
and
comprehending. 152 Advocates of greater regulation claim that it is
unlikely that terminally ill patients, perhaps incapacitated and
certainly frightened for their lives, can provide meaningful consent
153
when drug manufacturers market a new, untested treatment.
Under these circumstances, they argue, greater access to experimental
15 4
drugs is analogous to coercion.
As discussed above, greater regulation would amplify the costs
and delays of the American drug approval scheme.1 55 Furthermore,
the suggestion that terminally ill patients do not have the capacity to
give informed consent is an example of what Steven Salbu calls
"empathic failure." 156 Empathic failure occurs when legislators and
regulators are unable to understand the needs and concerns of the
15 7
group they attempt to protect-in this case, terminally ill patients.

150. See George J. Annas, Faith (Healing), Hope and Charity at the FDA The Politics of
AIDS Drug Trials, 34 VILL. L. REV. 771, 773 (1989) (describing controversy arising from the
divergence between the research agendas of medical investigators and the therapeutic hopes of
terminally ill patients).
151. Id. at 774.
152. Id. at 775.
153. Id. at 777.
154. Id. (quoting F.J. Ingelfinger, Informed (But Uneducated) Consent, 287 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 465, 466 (1972)).
155. See infra notes 39-46.
156. Salbu, supranote 3, at 425-26.
157. Id. at 425.
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Therefore, any attempt at protection takes "an enormous leap of
158
understanding" that is ultimately impossible.
B. Open Access Model
In response to the various shortcomings of current FDA
regulation, the polar opposite model, one of "open access," provides a
potential solution. 159 Few advocate such a model of regulation (or lack
thereof). Even Abigail Alliance, seen as an extreme promoter of
terminally ill patients' rights, does not promote complete deregulation
of experimental drugs. 160 However, this model would better serve
patient autonomy and self-determination. 161 Under the model,
terminally ill patients would have full access to all experimental
treatments, perhaps even regardless of their ability to pay.1 62 Where
the current regulatory scheme fails to protect the terminally ill
163
adequately, this plan offers a new paradigm.
Although individual rights advocates may favor an open access
164
model, the model fails on several practical and philosophical levels.
While completely open access, in which drug manufacturers are
required to provide experimental drugs to terminally ill patients
regardless of their ability to pay, may promote individual autonomy, it
ignores corporate autonomy. 165 Drug manufacturers may be unable or
unwilling to provide experimental treatment outside of the clinical
trial setting.' 66 Furthermore, if drug manufacturers are unable to
recoup the high cost of drug development through charging patients
for experimental drugs, much of the incentive to develop new drugs
may be lost.
From a philosophical perspective, although proponents of
deregulation advocate individual choice, the value of that choice is
predicated on the existence of a rational decisionmaker.167 However,
rational decisionmaking may elude patients in the absence of
158. Id. at 426.
159. Id. at 419.
160. Access, Compassion, Care, and Ethics for Seriously Ill Patients Act, S. 1956, 109th
Cong. § 5 (2005). This bill introduced by Senators Brownback and Inhofe in 2005 is supported by
Abigail Alliance. S. 1956; see Abigail Alliance Complaint, supra note 6, at 27.
161. Salbu, supra note 3, at 420.
162. Id. at 419.
163. Id. at 421.
164. Id.

165.
166.
167.
decision

Id. at 421-22.
Id.
Greenberg, supra note 38, at 670; see also Annas, supra note 150 (noting that the
maker must be able to give voluntary informed consent).
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information about the consequences of individual choice. 168 The FDA
regulatory scheme, mandating three phases of clinical trials as well as
evidence of safety and effectiveness, provides information on which an
individual can base a meaningful choice. 169 Thus, access to
experimental drugs creates a paradox: the ability to choose loses much
of its value in the absence of information forced by current FDA
regulatory policy. 170
Not only may open access undermine informed decisionmaking
by terminally ill patients, but it may hinder the production of
information for future decisionmaking. Critics of deregulation argue
that unfettered access to experimental drugs may make it impossible
to conduct scientifically valid clinical trials of new drugs. 17' FDA
regulations ordinarily require that new drugs complete three phases
of clinical investigation, two of which include controlled clinical
trials. 172 Though not mandated by regulation, Phases II and III are
completed by performing randomized, placebo-controlled clinical trials
in which a control group of patients is randomly assigned to receive a
placebo so that the effectiveness of an experimental drug may be
measured against no treatment. 173 If terminally ill patients can access
experimental drugs outside of the clinical trial setting, they will have
little incentive to enter these trials, lengthening the drug approval
process. 174 For those patients who do enter trials, the fear of
assignment to the placebo group may provide a perverse incentive to
75
break research protocol by taking drugs without supervision.
C. ContractarianModel
In response to criticism of both the paternalistic and open
access models of regulation, Steven Salbu has proposed an alternate,
contractarian model.1 76 Under this model, drug manufacturers could
sell experimental drugs to any patient with a physician prescription.
168. Greenberg, supranote 38, at 672.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 673-74.
171. Annas, supra note 150, at 786; Greenberg, supra note 4, at 333.
172. 21 C.F.R. § 312.21 (2008).
173. Soc'y for Clinical Trials Bd. of Dirs., The Society for Clinical Trials Opposes U.S.
Legislation to Permit Marketing of Unproven Medical Therapies for Seriously Ill Patients, 3
CLINICAL TRIALS 154, 155-56 (2006), available at http:l/www.sctweb.org/positionpaperslS.1956clinical-trials.pdf.
174. Annas, supra note 150, at 786.
175. Id. at 786-87.
176. The material discussed in the remainder of this Section can be found in Salbu, supra
note 3, at 422-33, 439.
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Patients would sign a waiver of liability covering both physicians and
manufacturers for any adverse reaction to the experimental drug.
Salbu argues that this model succeeds in protecting the rights of the
individual, preserving corporate autonomy, and promoting the state's
interest in public health.
Unlike the open access model, a contractarian model recognizes
individual and corporate autonomy by allowing access to experimental
drugs only after the voluntary agreement of both patient and drug
company. Unlike the regulatory paternalism of current FDA policy,
the contractarian model would treat individuals as ends rather than
means by allowing terminally ill patients to contract with any willing
drug provider. Under the FDA's current policy, terminally ill patients
may access experimental drugs only through clinical trials, thereby
undergoing a risk to themselves for the benefit of scientific discovery.
The contractarian model allows individuals' access to experimental
drugs for their own benefit, not only to further science.
In response to concerns that access to experimental drugs
would endanger the clinical trial process, Salbu argues that expanded
access would enhance scientific research. Although feedback from
individual patients may not provide quantitative data, it may produce
both research strategies and hypotheses for further study. Salbu also
notes that the traditional randomized, double-blind clinical trials are
not the only effective method to collect evidence on experimental drugs
for statistical analysis. Furthermore, there is not a great likelihood
that increased access would prevent drug manufacturers from filling
clinical trials. Such concerns overlook the inability of some patients to
afford experimental drugs outside the clinical trial setting and the fact
that some individual patients, for altruistic or other reasons, may
prefer to enter clinical trials over contracting directly with a drug
company.
Salbu's contractarian model faces much of the same criticism
as open access. Lacking crucial information, individual choice may be
meaningless. Advocates of the clinical trial process are unlikely to
accept the arguments that clinical trials are not necessary or not
endangered by increased access to experimental drugs. In addition,
Salbu's model raises two further issues addressed below: (1) the
ethical and legal status of liability waivers signed by terminally ill
patients; and (2) the extent to which drug manufacturers may market
experimental drugs to the terminally ill.
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V. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS
A. ProposedFDA Regulation
On December 14, 2006, three weeks after the D.C. Circuit
decided to rehear Abigail Alliance v. Von Eschenbach en banc, the
177
FDA published notice of two proposed rules in the Federal Register.
This development suggests that the advocacy of terminally ill patients'
rights groups initiated change in the administrative process,
regardless of their results in court. The proposed regulations
ostensibly interpret the Food and Drug Administration Modernization
Act of 1997, which amended the FDCA to include provisions for
increased access to experimental drugs. 178 Although deceptively
entitled "Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment
Use," the rule essentially clarifies existing regulations and policies
179
already in effect.
Current FDA policy allows individual access to experimental
drugs on a case-by-case basis through an informal Compassionate Use
exemption and allows access for broader groups of patients through
the Treatment IND exemption, the requirements for which are
codified in regulations. 8 0 However, the FDA has faced criticism for
failing to explain its procedures for granting individual patient access
through either guidance documents or further regulation.' 8 ' Critics
argue that this confusion has led to "disparate access to treatment
use," as patients not treated at academic medical centers are less
likely to be aware of the possibility of, or have access to, experimental

drugs. 182

177. The FDA is currently evaluating public comment on the proposed regulations and is not
expected to issue final rules for several months. FDA to let dying have experimental drugs,
PHARMA MARKETLETTER (UK), Jan. 29, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 2430937.
178. Expanded Access to Investigational New Drugs for Treatment Use, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,147,
75,149 (Dec. 14, 2006).
179. Id. at 75,147. The second proposed rule clarifies charging for investigational drugs,
especially in light of the proposed regulations for expanded access, but does not change the
FDA's basic policy, namely to allow drug research to charge under the Treatment IND exception
as a means of recouping the costs of development, but not for a profit. Charging for
Investigational Drugs, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,168 (Dec. 14, 2006).
180. Expanded Access to Investigational New Drugs for Treatment Use, 71 Fed. Reg. at
75,148; Treatment Use of an Investigational New Drug, 21 C.F.R. § 312.34 (2008).
181. Expanded Access to Investigational New Drugs for Treatment Use, 71 Fed. Reg. at
75,149.
182. Id.
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The new regulations were proposed in response to these
concerns.1 8 3 However, the first proposed rule would do little to
increase access to experimental drugs or to allow access to
experimental drugs earlier in the approval process. The rule expands
the existing regulation of Treatment INDs to cover access for
individual patients and intermediate-size patient populations, as well
as for the broader groups of patients currently covered by the
Treatment IND regulation, rather than increasing or speeding
184
access.
One notable provision does provide that, in determining
whether to grant expanded access to an experimental drug, the FDA
must determine "that the potential patient benefit justifies the
potential risks of the treatment use and that those potential risks are
not unreasonable in the context of the disease or condition to be
treated."1 8 5 Building on the Subpart E regulations promulgated in
1988, the FDA implied that the risk-benefit analysis that it employs in
approving drugs should differ for the terminally ill.186
Although nominally a victory for terminally ill patients' rights
advocates, the proposed rule will do little to advance their cause. The
FDA states that the agency "seeks to increase awareness and
knowledge of expanded access programs and the procedures for
obtaining investigational drugs," rather than actually to expand or
speed access.1 8 7 While some language in the proposal suggests that
access to experimental drugs should be granted earlier for seriously
and terminally ill patients, 88 the rule still imagines broad FDA
discretion. In addition, the FDA notes its concern with ensuring the
integrity of the clinical trial process.18 9 As the current Treatment IND
regulations grant access to drugs in the final stages of clinical testing,
expanding these regulations to cover access for individual patients
while maintaining the FDA's current clinical trial design likely will
not ensure the terminally ill access to experimental drugs as soon as
they want or need.

183. Id.
184. Id. at 75,150.
185. Id. at 75,151.
186. Expanded Access Changes MirrorNCCS/ASCO Petition,Not Abigail Plan, FDA WEEK,
Dec. 15, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 21817598.
187. Expanded Access to Investigational New Drugs for Treatment Use, 71 Fed. Reg. at
75,149.
188. E.g., id. at 75,150 ("[The proposed rule] aim[s] to facilitate the availability of
investigational new drugs to seriously ill patients when there is no comparable or satisfactory
alternative therapy to diagnose, monitor, or treat the patient's disease or condition.").
189. Id.
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B. ACCESS Act
A more radical proposal, backed by Abigail Alliance and
introduced in the U.S. Senate in the form of the ACCESS Act in 2005,
incorporates many aspects of Salbu's contractarian model within the
existing regulatory framework of the FDA.190 The bill asserts that
seriously ill patients have a "right to access" experimental drugs and
that the FDA's current case-by-case Compassionate Use exemption
must be extended to all seriously ill patients. 191
The proposed legislation envisions a three-tiered scheme to
regulate new drugs. 192 The third tier incorporates the existing
approval process for experimental drugs, while the first two tiers
expedite the approval process and expand access to experimental
drugs during the approval process. The plan's centerpiece is the
introduction of Tier 1 approval, through which a drug sponsor may
submit a new drug application containing only information from
completed Phase I clinical trials and any non-clinical evidence
collected on the drug's safety and effectiveness. FDA access to drugs at
this stage of testing requires a seriously or terminally ill patient who
has exhausted all FDA-approved treatment options; unsuccessfully
sought treatment with an experimental drug (presumably through
clinical trials); provided written informed consent; and provided a
written waiver of the right to sue the drug manufacturer or sponsor,
the prescribing physician, and the institution where the experimental
drug is administered. In determining whether to approve a Tier 1
application, the FDA must compare the totality of available
information to the seriousness of the condition or disease. Because
Tier 1 approval allows a drug manufacturer to market drugs at a
much earlier stage than do existing FDA regulations, the ACCESS Act
contains a provision limiting promotional materials.
The greatest strength of the ACCESS Act would have
materialized if the Supreme Court had ruled in favor of the plaintiffs
in Abigail Alliance v. Von Eschenbach. If terminally ill patients had a
due process right of access to experimental drugs, the bill would have
provided a framework to enforce this right within the existing
structure of the FDA. As a practical matter, the proposed legislation
attempts to address the potential issues of manufacturer liability,

190. Access, Compassion, Care, and Ethics for Seriously Ill Patients Act, S. 1956, 109th
Cong. (2005). An identical bill was introduced in the House of Representatives on September 29,
2006, by Representative Christopher Shays.
191. Id. § 2.
192. The following two paragraphs reference id. § 506(b), (e).
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marketing of experimental drugs, and the maintenance of adequate
clinical testing.
Although the ACCESS Act is a relatively recent development,
criticism likely will mirror that of the open access and contractarian
models. Already, the Society for Clinical Trials ("the Society") opposes
the proposed legislation. 193 The Society has taken issue with the
"repudiation of the scientific method that is embedded in the bill."194
In particular, the Society has concerns with a provision included in
the bill, unrelated to the three-tiered approval scheme, which
prohibits placebo-only or no-treatment-only control groups in clinical
testing. 95 This provision rejects the randomized clinical trial, which is
broadly accepted by the scientific community as the most reliable
method to gauge the safety and effectiveness of new drugs. 96
However, this criticism does not undermine the Tier 1 approval
process, which would require patients to have sought treatment in
clinical trials unsuccessfully before access to an experimental drug
19 7
outside of the clinical setting would be granted.
Further criticism of the ACCESS Act has focused on the
precarious position in which it would place a terminally ill patient.
Critics argue that requiring a patient to sign a waiver of liability in
the face of a potentially lifesaving experimental treatment amounts to
coercion.1 98 Citing evidence that only eleven percent of new drugs
tested in humans ultimately achieve FDA approval, critics fear that
this proposed legislation will permit drug marketing to sick and
vulnerable patients. 199 Not only will very few of these unapproved
drugs be effective, but many also may prove substantially harmful. 200
In all, the Society claims that the ACCESS Act is "not in the best
interests of the patients. '20 ' However, with modifications, the
ACCESS Act could be in the best interests of all interested parties.

193. Colin B. Begg et al., Marketing Drugs Too Early in Testing, 312 SCIENCE 195 (2006);
Soc'y for Clinical Trials Rd. of Dirs., supra note 173, at 154-57.
194. Soc'y for Clinical Trials Bd. of Dirs., supra note 173, at 155.
195. Id. at 155-56.
196. Id.
197. Access, Compassion, Care, and Ethics for Seriously Ill Patients Act, S. 1956, 109th
Cong. § 506(b)(5)(A) (2005).
198. Soc'y for Clinical Trials Bd. of Dirs., supra note 173, at 156.
199. Id. at 155.
200. Begg et al., supra note 193; Soc'y for Clinical Trials Bd. of Dirs., supra note 173, at 155.
201. Soc'y for Clinical Trials Bd. of Dirs., supra note 173, at 155.
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VI. SOLUTION: BUILDING ON THE ACCESS ACT
Despite the Society's concerns, the ACCESS Act has the
potential to serve the interests of terminally ill patients, as well as the
FDA, the public, and the Society itself. The ACCESS Act balances the
need to provide safe and effective drugs with the need to provide
earlier access to those drugs for the terminally ill. Whether or not the
Supreme Court determines that terminally ill patients have a due
process right to access experimental drugs, Congress should pass the
ACCESS Act, with a few modifications, and the FDA should
implement the new regime.
Although the ACCESS Act addresses drug manufacturer
liability by requiring patients to provide a written waiver of the right
to sue, the issue deserves further consideration. Some critics claim
that allowing terminally ill patients the option to access experimental
drugs amounts to coercion. A sick, vulnerable, and possibly
incapacitated patient lying in a hospital bed does not have the
capacity to make a voluntary and informed decision. 20 2 Requiring this
patient to sign away the right to sue in the event of an adverse event
caused by an experimental drug only compounds the ethical dilemma.
Absent a statutory provision making a waiver of liability binding,
under these circumstances, such waiver may be unenforceable at
20 3
common law.
Absent a statutory provision making a waiver of liability
binding, however, expanding access to experimental drugs for
terminally ill patients may prove unworkable. The market for
experimental drugs is unlikely to become an exceptionally profitable
one for drug manufacturers, as the number of terminally ill patients
in need of experimental drugs is relatively small, and the number
willing and able to choose unproven and expensive new drugs is even
smaller. Unable to earn substantial profits and faced with potential

202. See Annas, supra note 150, at 777 ("Incapacitated and hospitalized because of illness,
frightened by strange and impersonal routines, and fearful for his health and perhaps life, [the
patient] is far from exercising a free power of choice when the person to whom he anchors all his
hopes asks [him to help] ... carry out some very important research .... " (quoting Ingelfinger,
supra note 154, at 466)).
203. 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts §§ 284-85 (2004) (stating that a contractual term that
relieves a party from liability may be found unenforceable if it is the product of a gross inequality
in bargaining power or otherwise in violation of public policy); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 195(3) (1981) ("A term exempting a seller of a product from his special tort
liability for physical harm to a user or consumer is unenforceable on grounds of public policy
unless the term is fairly bargained for and is consistent with the policy underlying that
liability.").
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liability from any adverse reaction, drug manufacturers will have
little incentive to make experimental drugs available.
Despite critics' claims of coercion, the law often respects the
autonomy of the sick and vulnerable, even those on the brink of death.
The Cruzan opinion provides the extreme example, suggesting that an
individual subsisting on life support has a constitutional right to
refuse treatment. 204 Respecting a terminally ill patient's choice to sign
a contractual waiver of liability easily proceeds from respecting a
terminally ill patient's decision to choose death. Evidence of the law's
deference to an individual's freedom to contract, even from his or her
deathbed, also may be seen in the law of wills. 20 5 In light of these
examples, perhaps the common law should enforce a waiver of liability
signed by a terminally ill patient. Nevertheless, the ACCESS Act
provision requiring a binding waiver of the right to sue conforms to
the law generally. Because the provision furthers the aims of the
proposed legislation by removing any disincentive to supply
experimental drugs, it should be included in any legislation providing
increased access to experimental drugs passed by Congress.
The ACCESS Act also briefly addresses the extent to which
drug companies may market experimental drugs to the terminally
ill.206 Under the proposed legislation, Tier 1 approval would satisfy the
approval required by the FDCA before a new drug may enter
interstate commerce. 20 7 Ostensibly, without further restriction, Tier 1
approval alone would authorize a drug manufacturer to market its
new drug like any other. However, the marketing of experimental
drugs to the terminally ill requires further consideration. The
Supreme Court noted in Rutherford:
Since the turn of the century, resourceful entrepreneurs have advertised a wide variety
of purportedly simple and painless cures for cancer, including liniments of turpentine,
mustard, oil, eggs, and ammonia; peat moss; arrangements of colored floodlamps; pastes

204. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 286-87 (1990) ("[W]e do not think
the Due Process Clause requires the State to repose judgment on these matters with anyone but
the patient herself.... [T]he State may choose to defer only to those wishes [of the patient],
rather than confide the decision to close family members.").
205. See, e.g., Green v. Holland, 657 S.W.2d 572, 575 (Ark. Ct. App. 1983) ("A testatrix's old
age, physical incapacity and partial eclipse of the mind will not invalidate a will if she had
sufficient capacity to remember the extent and condition of the property and who her
beneficiaries are. Complete sanity in a medical sense at all times is not essential to testamentary
capacity provided that capacity exists at the time the will is executed, during a lucid interval.");
Bickel v. Louisville Trust Co., 197 S.W.2d 444, 446 (Ky. 1946) (noting that wills "are more often
than otherwise executed during one's last sickness, and while he is, so to speak, on his
deathbed").
206. Access, Compassion, Care, and Ethics for Seriously Ill Patients Act, S. 1956, 109th
Cong. § 506 (e)-(f) (2005).
207. Id.
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made from glycerin and limburger
cheese; mineral tablets; and 'Fountain of Youth'
2 08
mixtures of spices, oil, and suet.

Critics' claims of coercion resonate in the context of marketing
experimental drugs to the terminally ill. A terminally ill patient does
not have adequate information to decide which potentially lifesaving
treatment to undertake. Without limitation on drug manufacturers'
ability to promote newly approved experimental drugs, patients may
face a wide variety of marketed treatments among which they cannot
differentiate .209
In response to these concerns, the ACCESS Act would restrict
the promotional materials authorized for Tier 1-approved drugs. The
proposed legislation provides that promotional materials "may be
subject to the requirements that" the drug sponsor submit copies of all
promotional and advertising materials to the FDA before approval is
granted and that all advertising and promotional materials must
disclose the limited nature of Tier 1 approval. 210 However, this
conditional provision alone does not do enough to limit marketing of
experimental drugs to the terminally ill.
Any promotional restrictions should be mandatory rather than
left to the FDA's discretion. In particular, disclosure of the nature of
Tier 1 approval is of paramount importance to potential consumers. In
light of the minimal burden such disclosure would place on a drug
manufacturer, there is no reason such a restriction should not be
required. Moreover, the ACCESS Act should limit the parties to whom
a drug manufacturer may market its product. Without advice from a
physician, an individual patient is unlikely to evaluate the potential
success of any drug. Although this reality may be an argument for
eliminating all drug advertising, patients' general lack of information,
combined with the particular vulnerability of terminally ill patients,
suggests that direct marketing to the terminally ill may not only be
unhelpful but also potentially harmful. Given these concerns, the
marketing of Tier 1-approved experimental drugs should be limited to
those who have the ability to evaluate adequately and impassively the
likelihood of their success, namely physicians, hospitals, and other
medical institutions.
Finally, the ACCESS Act addresses the concern that increased
access to experimental drugs would endanger the clinical trial process
by refusing access to experimental drugs until a patient has

208. United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 554, 558 (1979).
209. Begg et al., supra note 193.
210. S. 1956 § 506 (e) (emphasis added).
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"unsuccessfully sought treatment with an experimental drug."2 11
Presumably, this language would require a terminally ill patient to
have sought access to a particular drug through a clinical trial before
access to that drug would be granted outside of the clinical setting.
This ambiguity may be cured through more precise statutory language
or by FDA regulations interpreting the Act, which should implement
this requirement. The FDA should promulgate additional regulations
prohibiting access to experimental drugs for patients currently
enrolled in clinical trials to counteract patient incentive to break
research protocol. These safeguards would ensure the integrity of the
clinical trial process by prioritizing full participation in clinical trials
and preventing sabotage to the results.
Prioritizing the existing clinical trial process raises another
issue in the ACCESS Act-the provision prohibiting placebo-only or
no-treatment-only control groups in clinical investigation. Supporters
of this prohibition claim that the use of placebo-controlled clinical
trials on terminally ill patients, in which the control group of patients
receives no treatment at all, is both unethical and unnecessary.2 12
These supporters allege that modern scientific and statistical
methods, such as the use of Bayesian statistics, would provide
adequate control data without the need for an untreated control
group. 2 13 Evidence for this perspective is seen in the FDA's use of such
methods in testing of medical devices, in which sham surgeries are not
performed to provide an untested control group. For example, the FDA
uses such methods in testing medical devices-sham surgeries are not
performed to provide an untreated control group in the testing of
2 14
medical devices.
Then again, this provision of the ACCESS Act faces strong
opposition from the scientific research establishment. The Society, in
particular, argues that the most reliable method to assess the
effectiveness of an experimental drug is through randomized clinical
trials that include a placebo-only control group. 21 5 The Society
provides several accounts of drugs that appeared promising on
211. Id. § 506 (b)(5)(A).
212. How About a 'Kianna'sLaw?, WALL ST. J., Mar. 24, 2005, at A14; Kianna's Legacy,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 29, 2005, at A14; Kianna'sLaw, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 2005, at A22.
213. Kianna's Legacy, supra note 212.
214. Id.; see also Salbu, supra note 3, at 434-39 (discussing some data collection alternatives
to randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled experiments, including non-placebo control
experiments, dose response trials, meta-analyses, and field research ).
215. Soc'y for Clinical Trials Bd. of Dirs., supra note 173, at 155; see also Annas, supra note

150, at 789-91 (describing randomized clinical trials as the " 'gold standard' upon which
experimental treatments are judged," and asserting that there is 'little dispute that the RCT is
the method most likely to produce valid results").
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anecdotal evidence alone, but later proved ineffective, even in
comparison to placebo treatment, after scientists performed
216
scientifically valid, randomized, controlled clinical trials.
Solving the debate over the necessity of placebo control groups
in clinical trials of drugs for the terminally ill is beyond the scope of
this Note. However, in order to succeed politically, the provision of the
ACCESS Act prohibiting placebo-only or no-treatment only groups in
clinical trials may need to be removed to increase the likelihood of
support in Congress. Without this provision, the ACCESS Act still
would provide access to experimental drugs after Phase I testing
through the creation of a Tier 1 approval process, consistent with the
due process right that Abigail Alliance seeks to have recognized in
court. Until scholarship offers a definitive answer on the issue of
placebo treatment, terminally ill patients' rights advocates calling for
increased access to experimental drugs should focus their efforts on
passing the Tier 1 approval process through Congress, leaving the
issue of placebo treatment for another day.
Because Abigail Alliance is unlikely to find success through the
judicial process, and the recently proposed FDA regulations will prove
unavailing, a modified ACCESS Act is the most likely method of
achieving the Alliance's goal of increased access to experimental drugs
for the terminally ill. As proposed, the ACCESS Act embodies many of
the strengths of Salbu's contractarian model. The modifications
proposed in this Note address the model's weaknesses. On balance,
the modified Act will protect both the FDA's interest in providing safe
and effective drugs and the interest of the terminally ill in obtaining
access to those drugs at an earlier stage of testing.
VII. CONCLUSION
Throughout the history of drug regulation in the United States,
both Congress and the FDA have responded to drug-related health
care crises that have called attention to shortcomings in the drug
regulatory scheme. While typical government response meant
increased or more stringent drug regulation, the AIDS epidemic
provided an opportunity for Congress and the FDA to respond with a
liberalization of the regulatory framework in an attempt to ensure
AIDS patients' access to new and potentially lifesaving drugs.
Although the story of Abigail Burroughs may not boast the epic
proportions and political significance of the AIDS epidemic, it does

216. Soc'y for Clinical Trials Bd. of Dirs., supra note 173, at 156.
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provide the government with an opportunity to improve its
experimental drug policy.
As a brief tour of Supreme Court jurisprudence suggests, the
Court is unlikely to overturn the expressed opinions of Congress and
the FDA, either through statutory interpretation or through
recognition of a new due process right. In this act of restraint, the
Court would be recognizing its limitations in the fields of science and
medicine. Moreover, courts traditionally defer to Congress and
agencies in light of their expertise and accountability. Although it may
be intuitive to leave the science to the scientists, there is little dispute
that access to drugs, experimental and otherwise, should be subject to
some amount of government regulation. The question is which branch
or branches of government are most competent to regulate the
regulation-the judicial branch or the political branches.
In light of the dynamic nature of science and medicine, the
constitutionalization of a regulatory scheme through judicial
recognition of new due process rights seems unsuitable. Instead, the
political branches, with their capacity for factfinding and adapting
policy in the face of new and improved scientific and medical
knowledge, are the appropriate branches to control the appropriate
amount of regulation of the scientific and medical fields. Although
determinations of the political branches necessarily will be imbued
with politics and value judgments that admittedly do not belong in
questions of science and medicine, there is little evidence to suggest
that courts would be free of political bias on these issues. Thus, the
Abigail Alliance and other terminally ill patients' rights advocates
should focus their attention on the possibility of affecting change
through the political rather than the judicial process.
The ACCESS Act is one potential avenue for affecting this
change. With a few modifications-strengthening the provisions on
experimental drug marketing and eliminating the provision
prohibiting placebo-only control groups-the ACCESS Act would
address the concerns of all interested parties and would become
politically palliative. Regardless whether Congress enacts the
ACCESS Act, in its current or suggested form, the changes to
experimental drug policy it suggests deserve further examination and
support. Even absent a constitutional due process right of access to
experimental drugs, the values inherent in the alleged rightautonomy and self-determination-should factor heavily in any
regulatory scheme in which individual lives are at stake.
This Note's conclusion-that terminally ill patients' access to
experimental drugs, as a question of science and medicine, is best
addressed through the political, rather than the judicial, process-has
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The same
implications beyond the experimental drug context.
analysis could be applied to the issues of abortion, medical marijuana,
and physician-assisted-suicide, among other questions of science and
medicine that the judiciary confronts. Like the right to access
experimental drugs, all of these issues have been the focus of due
process claims in court. The values of autonomy and selfdetermination inhere in these cases, and the recognition of a due
process right in the Constitution may seem a particularly satisfying
result to some. However, this Note's analysis suggests that, as
questions of science and medicine, they may be better addressed
through the political process, along with Abigail Alliance's claim of
increased access to experimental drugs. Relegation of these issues to
the political process should not entail the disregard of values inherent
in the liberty of due process rights, however. At least in the context of
access to experimental drugs, the best interests of all parties are
served by allowing for greater access and thus greater liberty.
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